(Caucasus Regional Policy Symposium,
Virginia, USA, March 25-28, 2004)

Religious processes encompassing adaptation challenges of Islam contemporary political realities are known for having their own peculiarities in post-Soviet space, including Caucasus. Those processes are in many aspects quite different to those in other states with Muslim majority (Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, Arabic countries, etc), where institutionalization of Islam has deep historical traditions – while Islam in post-Soviet countries could only exist at a social level during an almost 70-year reign of atheistic ideology. After the Soviet Union had collapsed, we nevertheless witnessed that the religious factor started to affect, and to a significant degree, the formation of various political ideas and models, claiming to have a certain role in social life.

We always complain about the lack of democracy in ex-Soviet republics and criticize the ruling regimes in those countries for their totalitarian behavior in dealing with the problem of civil society building and of course we are right to do that. But at the same time I would also take note of the fact that the most of those societies face the low level of democratic culture – first of all I mean Central Asian countries where the legal political opposition is not existing the way it should be, or North Caucasus where the political opposition with its democratic content has not been shaped yet unlike the Azerbaijan where the society has a fair amount of potential for democratic changes but for some local and international reasons still has hard time translating this potential into reality. I don’t want to change the subject of my talk getting into details of political situation in those countries but what I want to focus on in this regard is that one of those factors, impairing digestion of democratic culture by wide sections of the population, is also conditioned on complicated and contradictory religious situation in the region.

Following national independence gaining we faced a certain vacuum in term of religious issues, which led to distribution of various fundamentalist movements and popularization of fanaticism. In Azerbaijan, this painful process produces the greatest impact upon refugees of about 800 000 people from territories occupied by the Armenian military forces and those sections of population who according to the circumstances were doomed to serious economic difficulties. In the north part of Caucasus which is in Russia, Islam at some levels opposes to secular nature of state system establishment.

The complexity of regulation of religious affairs in the region is objectively conditioned by the fact that non-interference into religious affairs of citizens, as provided by secular nature of the state on one hand, and understanding of quite obvious and real prospects of religious conscience factor’s effects upon public-political situation in those countries forces the official authorities to develop certain measures of control over religious situation so that it would not lead to loosening of secular state principles, but I’d say the most of it, to the loosening of power that the authoritarian regimes try to grip on. The measures of control over religious situation are usually assessed from various positions. In the case when various Governments become too involved into administrative methods, the suitable environment occurs for criticism of such policy from viewpoint of respect of freedom of conscience, that secular states must provide to their citizens. Such criticism quite often occurs in annual human rights reports of the US Department of State and statements of some international organization.

Talking on Azerbaijan the early years of national independence in Azerbaijan brought Iranian, Turkish and Arabic capitals into construction of mosques and a wide range of Islamic literature was delivered from the neighboring states. For instance, books published in Cyrillic scripts in neighboring Iran were at that time very popular among the population. Certain religious circles in secular Turkey were also involved into religious confrontation with Iran in the territory of Azerbaijan. Unlike Iran, Turkey’s contribution into religious life of Azerbaijan in many cases used to be authorized by the local government structures. Emissaries from Arabic countries were also frequent guests in Azerbaijan. Thus it took a short period for traditional religiosity of some Azerbaijanis to develop – under the foreign influence – into Nurdjism, Vahhabism and politicized Shiism. Those new religious movements, brought into Azerbaijani realities, have established their social basis by means of formation of legal, semi-legal and at times illegal, educational network of Islam. Besides, Azerbaijanis have had access to higher educational centers of Islam in Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan.

In June of 2001, the State Committee for Work with Religious Organizations (SCWRO) has been established by decree of the President of Azerbaijan Republic. The State Committee has been provided with vast plenary powers in regard with solving religious problems.

The Azerbaijan has the Law on Freedom of Conscience. The law, adopted in August 1992, has been subject to numerous amendments, aimed at strengthening of state control over the religious situation. The corresponding changes and addenda were introduced to the law in June, November and December 1996, October 1997 and June 2002. However, religious circles of different kinds are still disappointed of this law in Azerbaijan which is believed not only to violet believer’s right at large scale but also contradict the Constitution. For example, despite the article 18 of Constitution says the religion is separated from the State and the article 25 of it provides for rights and liberties of everyone, irrespective of race, nationality, religion, language, sex, origin, financial position, occupation, political convictions, membership in political parties, trade unions and other public organizations – so called and un-interpreted “religious figure” is not allowed to be a member in political parties and to take part at elections. It could have been understandable if applied to States having religion accorded kind of formal status such as Pakistan and Egypt where Constitutions declare Islam as a state religion, but it’s not the case when applied to the secular states of ex-Soviet republics.

We may divide Islamic tendencies in Caucasus into three main categories: “traditional” Islam, “government-sponsored” Islam and “radical” Islam. The term “traditional” Islam is used to describe the conservative, overall rather passive attitude to religion that characterize the outlook of the great majority of Muslims. Islam mostly in the North Caucasus is still perceived more as an ethnic definition than as a religious allegiance. There is a strong sense of obligation “to maintain the traditions of forefathers”. This may be expressed in a variety of ways, encompassing different degrees of religious observance. For a few it involves a strict performance of the prescribed rituals. Many others tend to affirm their Islamic identity in a more cursory, symbolic fashion. As for “government-sponsored” Islam it is used to serve the needs of the state. As for the third trend – so called the “radical” Islam, it embraces groups of activists who want to purge Islam of the distortions and mostly have certain political goals. In regard with the whole region they represent rather different groups. Some of them are referred to as “Wahhabis”. They are existing and operating in Azerbaijan as well but unlike the North Caucasus they have their rivals within the “radical” Islamists represented in the camp of political Shia groups known for pro-Iranian orientation. Talking about Iranian influence over the religious situation it is obvious that Iran does not have any possibility to affect believers in North Caucasus where religious outlook of people is quite different from Shiism, unlike Azerbaijan where about 60% of population are to be considered traditional Shiites.

In Azerbaijan we very frequently discuss the issue of how serious Wahabi’s threat is to the country. In general, the number of Vahhabists does not exceed 5 thousand and they are divided into radically and moderately oriented. Radical orientation of Vahhabists does not at all mean they are extremists. The activities of several Vahabist organizations that were indirectly financed by radical movements of Islam, were outlawed. In recent times the level of radicalism reduced also under the direct social influence. Of course the main credit has to be given to the Azeri religious consciousness that does not accept any kinds of religious or national tendencies of radical nature. The second reason is related to the role of State Committee in establishment of control over activities of Vahhabist communities. Vahabism could not have been spread in Azerbaijan if not supported by some Arab charity organizations. There were some arguments put forward by a group of analysts that the political reason hiding behind the dissemination of Vahabism in Azerbaijan aimed at undermining the international efforts for Baku oil to be transmitted through Baku-Tbilisi-Jeyhan pipeline. The idea was about the role designated to Azerbaijan to export its oil through this pipeline, which allegedly could lessen the importance of oil rich Arab countries if it started working and thus they felt necessary to resort to use of undermining religious levers in order to establish certain social base from among the local population who could oppose to the official politics in regard with this issue. Some other analysts basing on the anatomy of events in Chechen and Dagestan argue that the most forces who are interested in Vahabism to be spread out in Azerbaijan are Russia’s intelligent services as it was sort of encouraged in Dagestan before the second war in Chechen when Russia got excuse to intervene for hunting not only Chechen rebels but also religious terrorist groups down which settled in Dagestan at that time. The idea is about to trigger separatist tendencies in the north part of Azerbaijan populated by lezgin minority. Actually this role used to be designated to organization “Sadval” outlawed in Azerbaijan but registered in Russia. Popularity of this organization now has declined o lot due arrests of some its members accused of cooperation with Armenia’s intelligent services and preparing attempts to blast a metro station off in Baku and some other facts. Analysts argue that the goal pursued to encourage the religious separatism is that it may ultimately give rise to the separatism on the ethnical basis. In 1992-2001 many local branches of Vahabist organizations such as “Al-Igasa”, “Islamic Congress”, “Islamic World”, “Vahabist repentance”, “Nigjat”, “Al-kheyriye” and others used to operate in that region of Azerbaijan while having headquarters in Russia, Dagestan.

As for Chechen it is obvious that the struggle for national independence under the banner of Islam although had a kind of unifying role for Chechens did nor bring any positive outcomes for the people. Having realized that some Chechen leaders tend to come up with kind of new option of solving problem they have with Russia. This option also includes Islam but in a version that is to serve as a theoretical justification of ancient traditions of Chechens which they are encouraged to develop. In a few words, they consider that Chechens do not have to care about the administrative, territorial and political establishment. To their mind the only important thing for Chechens has to be communal and tribal establishment which will include in its subjects rather families, clans and tribes than people who have lost their blood relationship with each other being simply certain separate individuals. In this regard they refer to Medina umma. This term “umma” is about the establishment of common Muslim nation, which is viewed as the ultimate priority of Muslims. Many Islamic scholars argue that the collective good of the umma can not be reconciled with the concepts of individual rights. Many groups, which adhere to a strict interpretation of Islamic traditions, argue that democracy is incompatible with Islam because it elevates individual rights above the communal wishes of the umma. As for new Chechen interpretation of umma it has to be the same as those of Medina time when prophet was the head of this kind of establishment which consisted of people tied to each other with blood relationship. They argue that this type of relationship was followed by forefathers of Chechens since the ancient times and still is suitable for those Chechens who dominate in mountainous part of historical Chechnia. Talking in brief they are ready to give up Chechnia of plains where people can go on living up to Russia’s rules while the mountainous area with staying as part of Russia will have live in accordance to their forefathers rules of umma establishment as a close society being neither modern secular type nor that of commonly accepted Islamic state.

Until recently, sociological sciences had a consensus on secularization of society. But this consensus no longer exists. There are ongoing stormy debates between followers of a traditional approach (mostly Europeans), who reduce processes of secularization of society to general modernization processes, and followers of a new American approach providing for establishment of competitive and pluralistic markets for firm religious ideas. Followers of the latter approach consider that Western European Christianity is on a slump as compared to stable activity of religious varieties in USA and contemporary revival of both Christian movements and non-Western religious traditions in post-colonial world. Other sociologists prefer to not hurry with their estimations and mention that neither traditional approach to secularization, nor American approach to religious markets could provide a convincing explanation of internal dynamics of secularization processes in Europe and revival of non-Western religious traditions in the rest of the world. They refer to the fact that revival of Islamic traditions is beyond the Orthodox model of secularization and free religious-market model.

As concerning Islam, one could agree that modernization processes in Muslim countries do not encourage the society secularization. This could be observed in Turkey, where now and then political forces with traditional Islamic roots come into power, but still do their best for admission into the European Union. Turkish version of official Islam is an internal factor, which does not have claims for competitiveness at foreign religious markets unlike Nurdjism, spreading its network in Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan and other Central Asia countries.

It’s obvious whatever controlling measures are taken by a post-Soviet secular state in respect of developing religious realities, it cannot use administrative-legal mechanisms alone to resolve the strategic task of determination of place and role of Islam according to objectives of civil society establishment. The state responsibility for resolution of problems with religious situation must include religious-educational work along with administrative-legal mechanisms. I clearly realize that recommending a secular state to deal with religious education of the population may at first glance appear to be a violation of the principle of separation of religion from the state. And by the way, in several cases, the religious circles were more zealous defenders of that principle than governmental officials. For instance, in Azerbaijan governmental initiatives concerning regulation of the activity of mosques, reconsideration of educational programs in religious schools, bringing the charters of religious communities in line with the legislation of Azerbaijan, ensuring transparency in respect of collection and utilization of donations, have caused negative reaction of Islamic leadership of Azerbaijan. “Attempted violation of the principle of separation of religion from the state will cause discontent of believers”, threatened S.Musayev, deputy head of the CMD to the Government. Such officially recognized Islamic religious leaders, just as underground Islamists, bearing forth certain political plans, have a clear realization that governmental measures in respect to religious affairs are causing a damage to their religious market. And absolutization of the principle of Europe-like separation of religion from the state in a Muslim country certainly suits their tactical objectives of living as a state within a state.

Under these circumstances, which approach must be followed in secularization of society by us, who support the establishment of a democratic secular state in independent countries with Muslim majority? Shall we keep to the spirit and rules of European interpretation of secularization through strict observation of the traditional principle of separation of religion from the state and modernization of society, or to the new American, still developing approach to encouraging pluralism and competition at religious markets, based on contemporary realities of revival of religious traditions?

Before we can answer these questions, I must make a reservation that unlike Christianity, Islam in its theoretical version, makes monotheism an absolute idea, excludes mediation between humans and God to the point of not recognizing the prophet’s right to such mediation, rejecting any mediating institutions. In other words, Islam theoretically does not have those church institutions that would in a centralized manner take care of religiosity of Muslim believers. But the case is different with the practice. Therefore, I would rather speak in this context of Sharia version of Islam but not of Islam as a whole because the Sharia version as being the most common for Muslims practicing the religious patterns and rituals seems to be quite discrepant to the Koranic version if Islam as a religion. It is the Sharia Islam that has a strives towards structuralization, institutionalization and organized approach to competition for religious markets. It should also be mentioned that Sharia Islam has arrogated to itself the monopolized right of owner to deal with the religious market, and shows painful reaction to religious dissent and heteredoxy. Besides, the struggle for religious markets between individual traditional movements in Islam is not a pluralistic struggle of opinions, but mutual exception, fraught with potential destabilization of religious situation. In this environment there is no use of encouragement of religious pluralism among Muslims in a secular state, when administrative-legal regulation of religious affairs in society is applied only. The state must be interested in making its own contribution into religious market of Islam. The objective is not leading the Islamic educational work on behalf of the state. The state must first and foremost be targeted at demonopolization of Islamic religious market, encouraging the propaganda of new interpretation of religious postulates for the sake of purposes and tasks of a secular state.

I am aware of some attempts to check out the theoretical and further practical possibilities of infusing such religious ideas into the Muslim societies that would seem to be more moderate than that of already existing ones in order to help from fundamentalist tendencies. Some experts think that we’d better encourage people to come back to revive Sufi traditions which seem to be attractive for their peacefulness. The common features of Sufism provide for preaching and justifying the necessity of getting away from “sinfulness of this world”, spiritual refinement and self-improvement. I admit that what makes Sufism more attractive one in the eyes of politicians is related to its philosophy (unity with the essence, with the spirit of the whole creation) based on mysticism that is basically the same in all religions. Sufism in it’s essence and authentic version is a mystical teaching keeping distance from political collisions. As far as this opposes the secular values so it represents to some degree kind of non-violent opposition to political power and it’s governmental structures. Despite all of this I have to note Sufism at times used to kind of become one of the varieties of political Islam in the person of its followers. For example, Imam Samil, well-known in the history of Russian empire which he struggled against to maintain the national and religious identity of people in Dagestan. Imam Shamil was the leader of Sufi Nakshbandiya order. And as far as he initiated kind of state building heading the struggle of Dagestaniis against Russian expansion on Caucasus he got the Sufi system of relationship based on the principle “murshid (mentor or master) – murids (novices)” changed into the system “absolute sovereign (supreme imam) – country citizens (obedient citizens). Another example may be taken from the history of Turkey. In early 30-s the secular Turkey headed by it’s founder Ataturk suffered a lot from undermining activities led by religious movements at that time. The particular role among those was served by traditional Sufi groups claiming the struggle against the godless rulers of modern Turkey. I guess I believe the examples that I give don’t serve necessarily as hallmark of Sufism and it’s supporters. Although they are far away from claiming to be applied to Sufism as a whole but anyway demand that experts take into count the sensitivity of the matter in case of shaping and searching for new approaches and ideas to be recommended for Muslim countries. Moreover, Sufism does not seem to be competitive one in the religious market and is not able to be spread out as much as other Islamic sects appealing to the current needs of population and at this modern time can be absorbed only by some elite groups of believers. In addition, one of the most common features that penetrate Sufism is its tendency to seclude the believers from society activities.

Over almost a decade we have been agitating a modernist approach to Islamic religion in general and issues of identifying the role of religion in life of Azeris in particular. After a continuous propagandist work, this approach has taken its final shape in our concept “On determination of place and role of Islamic religion in Azerbaijani society”. The main theological novelty of the document is that Azerbaijani Muslims are offered to give a consolidated preference to Koran and to gradually move away from Sunna, developing their religiosity exclusively in the light of Koranic logics. Such approach is based on the fact that religious consciousness of the majority of Azeri Muslims for certain reasons was not affected by medieval traditional dogmas prescribed by Sunna literature. This concept has provided for gross religionization of population and establishment of a perception mechanism of religious instructions that would limit Islam with moral and cultural spheres and provided the environment for erasing the border in religious consciousness between religious and secular values. From strategic viewpoint, our theologian instruments provide for secularization of society. Religious interpretations of Koranic logic are targeted at religious justification of generally accepted values of democracy, human freedoms, critical reconsideration of Shariat norms, etc. Among numerous measures for establishment of such mechanism, an important place is occupied by the necessity to introduce special Koranic classes into program of state secondary schools, and Koranic logic into program of humanitarian sciences in higher educational institutions.

In February and March of 2000, Azadlig newspaper published my articles from “Friday Conversations” series where Muslim believers were familiarized in light of Koranic logic with theologian justification of importance of using native language in study and propaganda of Islamic religion and as well as Muslim ceremonies and rituals. These articles have been a cause of stormy public and private debates covering all religious and not religious circles of Azerbaijan. The stir was up to the point that members of Islamic party threatened through a newspaper to make short work of the author. Some were openly accusing the author of complicity in Zionism, “pseudo-prophecy”, etc. It came a surprise to all that unpersistently presented idea in conflict with the traditional religiosity, could develop into an urgent highlight. And as soon as the idea started to gain popularity in the society even the most furious opponents from among radical Islamists gradually started to recognize the right of Azerbaijani language in rituals and ceremonies, except for namaz – traditional Moslem prayer, a bodily form of ritual service, when short Koranic suras are read in original. It was also used by state officials who developed and later implemented the religious policy of authorities as an ideological instrument for implementation of measures on limitation of foreign religious influence in the country in the general and in the sphere of Islamic education in particular.

The objective of strategic direction of such theologian initiatives, which serve democratic values, is identified today in such a way that believers are gaining the opportunities and skills to express their ideas more openly on various religious postulates, despite prohibitions imposed by religious leaders, and accordingly, the discussion of religious topics begins to withdraw from under monopoly of religious structures. It’s important also because traditional theologian arguments of circles interested in politicization of Islam, proliferation of religious-extremist tendencies, contradict with the contemporary human values and are subject to neutralization in face of well-reasoned approaches.

For instance, Koranic statement on freedom of conscience and tolerance (“There is no compulsion in religion” – The Cow, 256; “Surely who believe, and those who are Jews, and the Christians, and the Sabians, whoever believes in God and the last day, they shall have their reward from their Lord…”– The Cow, 62; and so on) contradicts the Shiite relation to the representatives of other religions who enter the Shia list of “unclean” (Khomaini, Explanation of Issues, Baku, page 16). The Shiite list of “unclean” may also include minor children whose grandparents and parents are not Muslims. If any of aforesaid relatives is Muslim, the child is automatically considered as “clean”. This is a typical example of how the intolerant attitude to other religions becomes anti-human even towards children whose religious affiliation is still undetermined.

Let me talk a little bit about the frequently debated issue of terrorism relation to Islam. In order to avoid causing moral distress to millions of upright and guiltless Muslims and proceeding from the good interest in development of inter-cultural relations and promoting involvement of nations into integration processes, it has been generally accepted that terrorists are criminals without religion, etc. It is nevertheless known that terrorists justify their activities by religious slogans and recruit fanatics zombied under the influence of theoretical messages that their religiosity is fostered upon, into the criminal network. The fact is that most of Islamic theologians in their interpretation of Koran continue to follow the principle of prevailing power of some verses over others that must be considered as “having lost their power”. Some of the latter verses are urgently calling for good deeds, blessings, etc. Such as for instance, “A good deed and an evil deed are not alike: repel evil with something that is finer, and notice how someone who is separated from you because of enmity will become a bosom friend” (Spelled out, 34). This verse, spiritually consonant with the Biblical principle of “do good to them that hate you”, is recommended by some of theologians to not be followed by Muslims, as it allegedly became invalid after the following verse was sent down: “When the hallowed months have slipped away, then kill the associaters wherever you may find them, and capture them, and besiege them, and waylay them at every outpost. If they should repent, keep up prayer and pay welfare tax, let them go their way. God is Forgiving, Merciful” (The Repentance, 5). The given verse describes a specific war situation and suggests that believers act as demanded by the war period requirements against the conquerors. It is however interpreted by theologian scientists as everyday norm of conduct that a believer must follow. A believer Muslim who was brought up on such interpretations, may definitely be used by organizers of terrorist actions.

Compared to other Muslim nations the common religiosity of population in Azerbaijan is to be considered relatively tolerant one. At the same time as I mentioned processes aimed at endangering this historical and traditional tolerance are currently underway due to the reasons that I mentioned. This surely is undesirable process. We are currently developing a mechanism to show resistance to this process. We are working and doing a lot in this direction. I hope this will be met with understanding and it needs to be supported by our friends. This is the question of resistance to ignorance and obscurantism, good command of updated and dynamic theoretical knowledge based on some theological novelties that are being developed in Azerbaijan by the Centre for Religion and Democracy under my leadership. These theories are suggesting the divine origin of freedom and democracy. This means that claims for freedom and democratic values are similar to those for holy religious values. I believe it will benefit our common efforts if people popularizing Islam in the West finally get free of the historical-traditional stereotypes. Though not easily processes are still going on in this direction in Azerbaijan. There might be nice prospects of finishing with the historical-traditional religious fundamentalism and transfer to goodly and theoretical styles of the freedom and democratic fundamentalisms. This is a holy work that is worth doing. Actually this kind of job that we are doing could serve as a ground for culture change doctrine that we always recommend American politicians to think of it while there is still obvious uncertainty with the future democratization in Afghanistan and Iraq.